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A “MEANINGLESS CHARADE”?  
PUBLIC PETITIONING AND THE INDELIBLE MARKS OF HISTORY 
Jane Marriott, School of Law, University of Surrey 
Worldwide, democracy is reportedly “backsliding”1, moving from “recession”, 
after the “democratic boom”2 of the twentieth century, to “retreat.”3  The United 
Kingdom (UK) is by no means immune from the trend.  The Democracy Index 
reveals that our democratic system is, today, characterised by “exceptionally 
low”4 levels of participation which are “among the worst in the developed 
world.”5  The Hansard Society’s Audit of Political Engagement identifies a 
“disgruntled, disillusioned and disengaged”6 electorate.  Active participation in 
politics is “in the doldrums”, with the majority of voters content to engage as 
“spectators rather than players.”7  High risks are associated with a high level 
of democratic disengagement.  Firstly, policy-, law- and decision-making are 
made to depend upon the consent of a disengaged and disinclined citizenry 
and, as such, may want for legitimacy.  Secondly, openings are created for 
‘extremists’ who promise to fill the void left by regular politics.  Third, a 
democratic deficit emerges and, fourth, the urgent need for change makes for 
sometimes rash or untested choices for renewal.8  The problems of declining 
participation and its attendant risks have not gone unnoticed and, with the aim 
of “shifting the agenda” towards “actively assisting a greater degree of public 
participation” and “nourishing representative democracy” 9 , a series of re-
                                                                                 
1 Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat (EIU, 2010), p.1 
2 L. Diamond The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle  to Build Free Societies Throughout the World (Times Books, 2008),  p.12 
3 P. Skidmore and K. Bound The Everyday Democracy Index (Demos, 2008), p.29 
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engagement proposals emerged.10  Directed not only at encouraging citizens’ 
exercise of the right to vote and improving voter turnout (perhaps the most 
obvious and instrumental indicator of levels of participation) but also at 
boosting public engagement with politics beyond specific and relatively 
infrequent electoral events, proposals included plans for the reinvigoration of 
public petitioning.     
 
The idea that, reformed, the ancient practice of petitioning Parliament might 
provide a stimulus for democratic engagement in the modern world is neither 
rash nor untested.  Certainly, over the lifetime of three Labour governments 
between 1997 and 2010, petitioning was consistently envisaged as one of 
democracy’s saviours, albeit little progress was made beyond the opening of 
a much-criticised e-petitioning facility on the 10 Downing Street website.  In 
the run up to the 2010 General Election, the Conservative Party pledged that, 
in power, it would “reinvigorate the ancient tradition of the public petition”, 
giving it “greater force than it has ever had in Parliament’s history” and, in a 
sideswipe at the Downing Street model, promised “[r]eal people power; not 
online gimmicks.”11  Post-election, plans in that regard were lifted by the newly 
formed coalition government directly from the Conservative Party’s general 
election manifesto12 and resulted in the creation of a new e-petitioning facility 
hosted on the DirectGov website, which went live on August 4, 2011.  An e-
petition may be submitted about anything for which the government is 
                                                                                 
10 See, for example, Ministry of Justice The Governance of Britain, Cm.7170 (2007); House of Commons Procedure Committee, First Report, 
Public Petitions and Early Day Motions (2007-8 HC513); House of Commons Reform Committee, First Report, Rebuilding the House (2008-9 
HC1117)  
11 G. Young “New Politics” http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2010/02/Sir_George_Young_New_Politics.aspx accessed April 30, 
2012 
12 Invitation to Join the Government of Britain: The Conservative Manifesto 2010 (Conservative Party, 2010), p.66  
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responsible with ‘real people power’ being manifested through a debate in 
Parliament on the subject of a petition attracting 100,000 signatures or more 
which is deemed eligible by the Backbench Business Committee (BBBC).  
Here it will be argued that whilst, in its first year of operation, nearly 30,000 
petitions have been lodged13, with seven triggering a parliamentary debate, 
the initiative has left, unacknowledged and unaddressed, a number of 
indelible historical, constitutional and political marks which, remaining as 
traces and impressions on the principles, purposes and practices of 21st 
century petitioning, may condemn it to failure as Jenkins’ “meaningless 
charade”14 of past experience. 
The Origins of Petitioning 
The significance and extent of petitioning has fluctuated over the centuries 
yet, despite Lawson and Seidman’s claim that, in the modern context, the 
practice seems artifactual and meagre15, there is no denying its historical 
importance as a manifestation of political discourse in an evolving political 
community.  It is claimed by Mark, however, that the history of petitioning is “to 
constitutional and legal history as the history of alchemy is to the history of 
chemistry or the history of science” meaning that it is significant but, he states, 
“lacks immediate relevance.”16  Whilst they might be temporally distant, it is 
contended here that ancient and modern petitioning possess greater 
contiguity than Mark credits.  The labelling of the study of early petitioning as 
occultist and esoteric is, therefore, mistaken since its principles and practices 
resonate in modern times.  The historical excursion undertaken here is not 
                                                                                 
13 At April 30, 2012 
14 D. Judge “Public Petitions and the House of Commons” (1978) 4 Parl. Affs. 391, 395 
15 G. Lawson and G. Seidman “Downsizing the Right to Petition” (1998) 93(3) Nw. U. L. Rev. 739 
16 G. Mark “The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to Petition” (1998) 66(6) Fordham Law Rev. 2153, 2158  
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designed to fulfil the role of Flaherty’s “rhetorical trope.”17  Nor is it intended 
simply to gaze upon petitioning through Whiggish spectacles since, as Leys 
has observed, petitioning has a “notably discontinuous” 18  history.  It is, 
however, necessary to identify the origins of the petitionary framework, which 
persists to this day, in order to reveal certain of its surviving, and problematic, 
characteristics.  
Function 
Based on the Anglo-Saxon, Edgarian idea of redress, petitioning has its roots 
in the Middle Ages, with the first recorded petition being presented to King 
Aethelred in 1013.19  Whilst, according to Radin, “Medieval political theory 
fully accepted the doctrine that power might be wrongfully exercised” 20 and, 
according to Lawson and Seidman, Medieval law fully recognised “the moral 
concept that a wrong ought to be made right”21 only three means of redress 
were then recognised: “rebellion … outward submission and inward 
indignation.”22   Early petitioning thus reflected the socio-political and legal 
conditions of medieval England where, for those subject to the conflicting, tri-
partite authority of an immature legal system, a stratified society based on 
fealty and homage, and a monarch acting as God’s vicegerent, it performed 
as a crude and intermittently used mechanism of outward submission aimed 
at “mediating conflict between norms of legality and feudal structures.” 23  
Although petitioning was a well-established practice by the time of the 
                                                                                 
17 M. Flaherty “History Lite in American Constitutionalism” (1995) 95(32) Columbia Law Rev. 523, 524 
18 C. Leys “Petitioning in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries” (1955) 3(1) Polit. Stud. 45, 45 
19 N. Smith “Shall Make No Law Abridging: An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right to Petition” (1985-6) 54 U. Cin. L. Rev 
1153, 1154 
20 M. Radin “The Myth of Magna Carta” (1947)  60(7) Harvard Law Rev. 1060, 1067 
21 G. Lawson and G. Seidman “Downsizing the Right to Petition” (1998) 93(3) Nw. U. L. Rev. 739, 744 
22 M. Radin “The Myth of Magna Carta” (1947)  60(7) Harvard Law Rev. 1060, 1067 
23 G. Lawson and G. Seidman “Downsizing the Right to Petition” (1998) 93(3) Nw. U. L. Rev. 739, 739 
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“symbolic turning point”24 of Magna Carta in 1215, it was established “with a 
finality much more imposing than its subsequent observance.” 25  As such, 
Spanbauer conceives of early petitioning as a form of empty-gesture politics.  
Petitions would be submitted, to which the monarch’s response was “little 
more than a hollow act of grace”26 exhibiting indifference, retaliation or whim: 
the King’s inclination to consider his subjects’ petitions was a matter of 
“pragmatic calculus rather than legal requirement”27, priority was inevitably 
accorded to his own or his cronies’ interests and petitioners risked 
punishment for petitioning, as it were, ‘out of turn’.  
 
Magna Carta itself was the end result of “a long process of friction, discontent 
and negotiation” 28  involving “different but converging forces, some … 
progressive and some reactionary” but all “goaded into opposition”29 by the 
King’s abuses of feudal structures and relationships, his rejection of the idea 
and nascent culture of good government and his oppression of the people.30  
By Magna Carta’s terms, the King was bound to observe its conditions and 
protections and, if he did not, receive any “petition to have that transgression 
redressed without delay.”31  Yet, with many of its provisions ignored, amended 
by implication, or systematically expunged, as a means of coercing an 
aberrant monarch the Charter proved at best “crude and ineffective”32 and, at 
                                                                                 
24 D. Rollison A Commonwealth of the People: Popular Politics and England’s Long Social Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.83 
25 D. Smith The Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances: Constitutional Development and Interpretations 1971 (unpublished thesis), p.10 
26 J. Spanbauer “The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth” (1993-94) 21 
Hastings Const. L.Q. 15, 22  
27 G. Lawson and G. Seidman “Downsizing the Right to Petition” (1998) 93(3) Nw. U. L. Rev. 739, 762 
28 J. Loengard Magna Carta and the England of King John (Boydell Press, 2010), p.46 
29 W. McKechnie Magna Carta: Text and Commentary (Maclehose, 1914), pp.35-37 
30 W. McKechnie Magna Carta: Text and Commentary (Maclehose, 1914), pp.35-37 
31 Magna Carta 1215 did not appear in sections but, in translation, the provisions in respect of petitioning the monarch appear at Clause 61. 
32 J. Spanbauer “The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth” (1993-94) 21 
Hastings Const. L.Q. 15, 22  
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worst, “a failure.”33  Moreover, in substance, it delivered “little real power to 
one attempting to assert redress if the monarch or a royal favourite had a 
substantial interest in the matter”34 and applied only to the narrow class of free 
men.  Whilst it may not have succeeded in tempering the King’s will, or 
extending guarantees to a significantly enlarged sector of the population, and 
whilst its true legacy remains hotly contested, for present purposes it is 
sufficient to note that Magna Carta embodied, envisaged and recognised the 
petition as the means of securing redress of grievances.  Its effect in this 
regard was threefold.  Firstly it “familiarise[d] people with the idea that by 
means of a written document it was possible to make notable changes in the 
law.”35  Secondly, it formally identified a vehicle for remediation.  Thirdly, it 
provided a channel for grievance and, sometimes, agitation.36  The petition 
became the accepted mechanism for making political complaints, suggesting 
changes in law and policy, and seeking review of the actions of government 
officials.37  In fact, so significant was petitioning to the ritual of government 
and routine parliamentary business that it became subject, relatively promptly, 
to form and process management.           
Procedure 
The reign of Edward I – that “hesitation between feudalism and the political 
community”38 – first witnessed the regular, and regularised, submission of 
petitions to clerks appointed by the King to receive, sort and refer them,39 a  
                                                                                 
33 J. Holt Magna Carta 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.1 
34 D. Smith The Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances: Constitutional Development and Interpretations 1971 (unpublished thesis), pp.14-
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consequence of which was their presentation in writing rather than orally.40  
Since redress that could not be procured at law could be obtained only via the 
King’s grace and favour, and convention mandated that each petition would 
receive a response, addressing petitioners’ grievances dominated 
parliamentary business.41  The fledgling Parliament was largely an instrument 
for securing satisfaction and redress42 - “the facilitator of royal government 
and justice”43 - with the petition serving as the stimulant for action.  That 
redress might now be sought by the people “at large”44  meant that, to a 
degree, Parliament had “opened up”45 to the broader population.  Dodd joins 
Brand in viewing this as the consequence of a “deliberate shift in government 
policy”46 during the 1270s which, though motivated by the desire to check and 
control local officials and affairs, made the Crown more accessible and 
responsive.47  The Crown’s subjects remained “servants of the prerogative” 48 
to the extent that redress remained in the gift of the King but at least it might 
now be sought and secured at the point of a pen rather than the point of a 
sword.49  Such were the numbers of petitions submitted that, soon, yet more 
intricate procedures for their management were devised.  Over time, specialist 
panels of receivers and triers of petitions were constituted.  Hard cases were 
reserved for the attention of the King, King and Council, or, from the late 
                                                                                 
40 T. Plucknett A Concise History of the Common Law (Liberty Fund, 1929), p.178 
41 G. Haskins “The Petitions of Representatives in the Parliaments of Edward I” (1938) 53(209) Engl. Hist. Rev. 1, 18 
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1400s, the Court of the Star Chamber, whilst the remainder was dispatched to 
appropriate departments of government to be resolved by officials.50    
 
By today’s standards, fourteenth and fifteenth century procedures were 
“primitive” and “rudimentary”51 but petitioning flourished and remained a “large 
and steady”52 charge on King and Council’s time.  By Edward III’s reign it was 
established that, at the opening of Parliament, the Chancellor would declare 
the King willing to consider the petitions of the people. 53   Petitions thus 
provided an interface between Parliament and the wider community54 and, for 
the time, “an extremely wide band of English society participated in politics by 
petitioning for redress of grievances.”55  Petitions were submitted in quantity, 
by a broader range of citizens than ever, with the “petitionary diplomatic”56 
becoming increasingly sophisticated and rule-bound.  Alongside ordinances 
defining petitionary processes57, there arose a degree of consistency in how 
they appeared: short, written on strips of parchment and authored “in 
accordance with the rules of the specific genre of this type of document”.58  
They were drafted in Latin or, most often, French (though English would 
predominate from the fifteenth century), adopting a recognisable style and 
diplomatically submissive form of words.  In addition to recording individual 
                                                                                 
50 T. Plucknett A Concise History of the Common Law (Liberty Fund, 1929), pp.178-9 
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grievances, petitions were employed to register collective complaints, that 
being an indication of a future, fundamental purpose.  
 
As feudalism broke down, political institutions evolved, forms of 
representation began to develop and a centralised bureaucracy took hold59, 
petitioning remained a constant in the realms of mundane parliamentary 
business.  It had, however, been marked in three distinct ways.  First, it 
embedded, rather than challenged or changed, existing structures of 
authority.  Second, increasingly arduous procedural requirements had 
become the means by which petitioning, and access to it, was controlled.  
Third, it was open to capture by troublemakers, both common and elite.  In 
what follows it will be argued that those marks remain and pose distinct 
dangers to petitioning’s renewal as a participatory initiative in the 21st century.   
Structures of Authority 
It is manifest that early petitioning exhibited a tension.  On the one hand it was 
understood as “the foundation of politics” 60 , inviting both individual and 
collective participation in political life.  On the other, as a form of entreaty and 
submission to authority, it replicated and reinforced extant hierarchies. 61  
Consequently, petitioning “incorporated a certain type of constitutional politics 
and constitutional structure”, namely that which “embodied the deference and 
formalisms attendant on a relatively hierarchical community” 62  and was 
“premised on a vision of ultimate royal authority.”63  Thus, whilst petitioning 
provided channels of expression for citizens’ occasional “explosion of 
                                                                                 
59G. Lawson and G. Seidman “Downsizing the Right to Petition” (1998) 93(3) Nw. U. L. Rev. 739, 746 
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irritability” 64 , and whilst a responsive monarch or Parliament proved the 
“vitality”65 of the practice, Hoyle notes the ultimately “deeply conservative” 
nature of petitioning and its ingrained observance of “existing political 
structures.”66  These characteristics allowed petitioning to be tolerated unless 
it involved large groups, became dangerously regionalised or threatened the 
status quo, when an assertion of royal or parliamentary authority might 
redefine it as sedition, respond to it as rebellion67 and, so, re-establish the 
natural order of things.  Active petitioning formed part of the backdrop to 
notable incidents of rebellion and repression: the widespread Peasant’s 
Revolt of 1381, for example, employed petitions as a means of pressing for 
the abolition of villeinage; the 1536 Pilgrimage of Grace saw petitioning 
manifest cross-class attachment to the Roman Catholic church; Norfolk-based 
Ketts Rebellion of 1549 proceeded from petitioning against enclosures in an 
area where petitioning would continue to feature prominently as a means of 
agrarian agitation.68  Particularly in the crises of authority and legitimation 
caused by Plantagenet economic and dynastic struggles and the Henrician 
reformation, therefore, elite anxiety about, and contempt for, popular political 
opinion resulted in bouts of repression: “socialised into an authoritarian world-
view, it was sometimes difficult for the early modern elite to comprehend 
popular complaint as anything other than seditious”69 claims Woods.   
 
                                                                                 
64 D. Guth and J. McKenna Tudor Rule and Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 1982),  p.143 
65 D. Guth and J. McKenna Tudor Rule and Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 1982),  p.143  
66 R. Hoyle “Petitioning as Popular Politics in Early Sixteenth Century England” (2002) 75 Hist. Res. 365, 367 
67 R. Hoyle “Petitioning as Popular Politics in Early Sixteenth Century England” (2002) 75 Hist. Res. 365, 367 
68 R. Hoyle “Agrarian Agitation in Mid-Sixteenth Century Norfolk: A Petition of 1553” (2001) 44(01) Historical Journal 223 
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The state-citizen relationship was not the only one subjected to hierarchical 
conditioning, since petitions were often the weapons of choice in the struggle 
for supremacy between the monarch and Parliament.  Guth and McKenna 
remark that, in Tudor times, whilst Parliament was “an effective vehicle for an 
organized and focused body of public opinion” it also proved “a blunt but 
serviceable instrument” 70 in petitioning against the monarch, notably as an 
initiation for, or response to, royal proclamations.71  Similarly, in the years 
preceding the Protectorate, the Stuart monarchy, as a means of re-asserting 
its own power and perpetuating hostilities with Parliament, would answer a 
petition favourably when the Commons opposed it. 72   In two important 
respects, therefore, petitioning should not be viewed simply as a benign 
manifestation of public involvement in politics since, firstly, it represented a 
contingent, hierarchically ordered form of participation for the citizenry and, 
secondly, was inherently subject to manipulation by those in authority.  It 
should also be recognised that Parliament, hierarchically populated and 
inclined, was as much a danger to citizens expressing their grievances 
through petitions as an absolutist King.  Spanbauer notes, for example, that 
whilst the rise of Parliament entailed a shifting of power, for petitioners all that 
shifted was the source of their punishment.73  Should citizens be permitted to 
make true participation out of petitioning, therefore, a modification to the 
distribution, rather than the locus, of power was needed.   
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72 D. Smith The Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances: Constitutional Development and Interpretations 1971 (unpublished thesis), p.38 
73 J. Spanbauer “The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth” (1993-94) 21 
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That may be argued to have occurred as a result of the turbulence of the 
seventeenth century, culminating in the Glorious Revolution, with petitioning 
as one of its motors.  Indeed, Smith has it that the Case of the Seven Bishops 
– charged with seditious libel and imprisoned for submitting a petition to the 
King opposing his order that the second Declaration of Indulgence be read in 
church - led directly to the Revolution. 74   Schnapper cites the Bishops’ 
eventual acquittal as a “cause of rejoicing throughout England” and, likewise, 
“a major step towards the Glorious Revolution.”75  Zaret claims that petitioning 
gained important ground in this period, when “no communicative practice for 
sending messages from the periphery to the center had greater legitimacy.”76  
Moreover, the character of petitions had fundamentally altered, evolving from 
notes of private grievances into expressions of overwhelmingly public concern 
aimed at changes in the law.  Rather than performing the role of simple 
supplicatory device, therefore, petitions now generated and asserted public 
opinion in a public sphere that they helped create.  Knights also sees the mid 
seventeenth century as an important tipping point for participatory politics, 
arguing that the public “acquired new prominence and importance … with an 
enlarged role as a legitimizing power and as an umpire.”77  This was not 
simply the inevitable consequence of the Glorious Revolution, but was also 
attributable to developments in printing, education and the dissemination of 
information alongside the presence of Enlightenment-driven ideological 
conflict - including conflict about the identity and rights of ‘the people’.  As a 
                                                                                 
74 N. Smith “Shall Make No Law Abridging: An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right to Petition” (1985-6) 54 U. Cin. L. R.ev 
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result, for Knights, petitioning was one of the “key points of interface” 78 
between a Parliament and populace engaged in negotiating and constructing 
a new political order, albeit couched in the “polite discourse”79 of old.  Whilst 
intuitively appealing, this depiction of an emerging heterarchy, is, perhaps, 
illusory. 
Heterarchy 
Although petitioning may have served as a rough substitute for 
representation 80 , becoming “the formal mechanism whereby the 
disenfranchised joined the enfranchised in participating in English political 
life”81, Spanbauer maintains that the history of petitioning is largely divorced 
from the politicisation of the citizenry.  Instead, she views petitioning simply as 
a weapon in the power struggle between monarch and Parliament until, in the 
seventeenth century, Parliament gained control and petitioning took on 
political and rights-based meaning for the people at large.82  For Carpenter, 
however, that meaning was more symbolic than real since the increasing 
centrality of Parliament threatened to undo the popular utility of petitioning.  
The petition became less a “meaningful political instrument” and more “an 
expression of sentiment” which was, at best, “orthogonal to the institutions of 
the realm.”83  There is, therefore, a strong sense in which, despite invocations 
of progress in participation, representation and, ultimately, full democracy, 
petitioners as manifestations of ‘the people’ were seen either as something to 
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be ignored, or as “gullible and perhaps hypo-critical pawns in a power game 
they only partially understood.” 84   Not all would agree, however, since 
Bradley’s examination of petitioning in the context of English perceptions of 
the American Revolution, reveals contemporary practice as a more ideological 
and strategic than straightforwardly supplicatory activity undertaken by an 
ignorant and malleable public.     
 
In the late eighteenth century, the American revolution caused the English 
public to focus intensely on the viability of Parliament’s supremacy and role as 
a representative institution. 85   This revealed two distinct tenets of public 
opinion, as expressed in the “paper combat”86  of petitioning.  Those who 
favoured a “participatory, active and independent expression of political life” 
petitioned against those who sought to maintain “order, deference to 
authority”87 and exclusivity in the exercise of political expression.  As such, 
popular politics involved: 
“both political ideology and political interest, with the competing 
interests profoundly divided over the appropriateness of 
alternative political strategies and the validity of broader political 
participation”88   
 and public opinion was revealed as “factious, contradictory, and irrational.” 89   
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Fraser, whilst accepting that those profound divisions existed, and agreeing 
that the involvement of the masses “electrified the issues of the day with a 
novel and barely-understood type of urban terror”90, takes issue with what he 
sees as the overly simplistic and romanticised characterisation of the pre-
Reform era as a series of “dangerous and convulsive agitations”91 in a class 
struggle which would eventually be resolved by the passing of the 1832 
Reform Act.  Arguing that the depiction of a repressive and out of touch 
Parliament dominated by self-interested aristocrats pitted against a radical 
and newly assertive public is misleading, Fraser prefers to view the 
heightened scale and power of popular agitation as a result of the Crown’s 
declining authority, the growing influence of the press, and Parliament 
acquiring “assumptions of democracy”, “forging “subtle and organic links” with 
the community and revealing itself to be adaptable to change.92  That change 
was taking place was seemingly self-evident, and petitioning was an important 
factor in expanding the role of public opinion as an initiating, rather than 
simply restraining, force.93      
 
Although assessments of the pre-Reform era’s external political environment 
might be insufficiently refined for Fraser’s tastes, he does concede that 
Parliament’s internal environment engendered a receptiveness to public 
opinion as expressed in petitions that was hardly dispassionate: the House of 
Commons, he states, “responded effectively to articulate opinion ... [that] … 
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mirrored accurately the social pre-eminence of the middle classes”94, allowing 
only that class to achieve prominence as a force in politics.  Although many of 
its members had supported the reformist movement of the late eighteenth 
century, the middle class - galvanised by its emotional responses to the 
extremes of the Peterloo Massacre and prosecution of Queen Caroline’s 
adultery, and “newly enlightened as to its own economic self-interest”95 - was 
as alarmed as the upper by “the great underswell of popular discontent”96 
generated by popular radicalism when all it was seeking for itself was 
acceptably moderate reform, driven by a desire for political stability and 
preservation of the status quo.  Members of the working class were destined 
to remain outsiders, therefore, being unable to challenge either the monopoly 
of the gentry or the hostility of the middle class and being “fatally handicapped 
by a lack of sound leaders, sound economic theory … persistence or 
solidarity.”97   As a result, the hierarchy would remain intact98  even under 
assault from the Chartist movement at its height, between the late 1830s and 
early 1850s, when petitioning underwent “prodigious growth”99 and the petition 
came into its own as a “legitimate weapon” and “instrument of political 
struggle.”100   
 
The impetus for Chartism was to secure, through the People’s Charter of 
1838, that which, despite the Reform Act 1832’s enfranchisement of around 
18% of the population, still eluded the majority.  If adopted, the Charter would 
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afford suffrage to males aged 21 and over (unless a felon or insane), effect 
the secrecy of the ballot, removal of property qualifications for MPs, payment 
of MPs and equal representation and establish annual parliaments.  It was 
supported by petitioning on an unprecedented scale, with the three national 
petitions of 1839, 1842 and 1848 garnering 1.2, 3.3 and 2 million signatures 
respectively.101  The first national petition noted that “the few have governed 
for the interest of the few, while the interest of the many has been neglected, 
or insolently and tyrannously trampled upon”102 and explicitly acknowledged 
the failure of the Reform Act 1832 to remedy that state of affairs.  Where it 
had been “the fond expectation of the people that a remedy for … their 
grievances, would be found in the Reform Act of 1832” they had, instead: 
“been bitterly and basely deceived … The fruit which looked so 
fair to the eye has turned to dust and ashes when gathered.  
The Reform Act has effected a transfer of power from one 
domineering faction to another, and left the people as helpless 
as before.  Our slavery has been exchanged for an 
apprenticeship to liberty, which has aggravated the painful 
feeling of our social degradation, by adding to it the sickening of 
still deferred hope.”103 
 
According to Pickering, although Chartists petitioned “”with ferocity and 
doggedness”104, the advent of democracy weakened both the popularity and 
raison d’être of the practice.  Similarly, Emden argues that once the struggle 
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for the vote had been won, petitioning declined, since provision for the 
representation of the people alongside a marked extension of the franchise 
meant that there were no longer “deficiencies to be mitigated”105 by it.  There 
is, perhaps, mileage in Emden’s point but, even if petitioning did provide a ‘fix’ 
for defective representation, the suggestion that enfranchisement eliminated 
the need for alternative means and modes of participation overlooks the fact 
that voting and petitioning are two separate, rather than interchangeable, 
manifestations of democratic involvement.  Indeed, it may be contended that 
petitioning is at risk from voting when they are viewed as interchangeable as 
that overlooks the fact that they perform different functions within our 
democratic processes.  They are distinct and complementary, rather than 
synonymous, participatory activities each capable of extinguishing the other’s 
utility.  It is not, therefore, evident that enfranchisement per se obviates the 
need for petitioning.  Moreover, if petitioning did ever constitute a workable 
substitute for voting, it certainly did not achieve natural redundancy via a 
process of gradual enfranchisement.  As will be seen, petitioning was serially 
and systematically dismantled through successive procedural initiatives.  
Political manipulation rather than democratic capitulation assisted its demise.  
As Judge observes, “restrictive rules, emasculating the parliamentary potency 
of petitions, contributed far more directly to the decline of petitioning than did 
the extension of the franchise.”106       
The Mirage of Democratic Participation 
The drift towards democratisation as generally experienced by the west – a 
gradual expansion of the franchise, overseen by elites and accompanied by 
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the faltering emergence of civil associations amongst the included - might be 
argued to inhibit the kind of participation envisaged by petitioning and 
engender the entrenchment of existing hierarchies.  Democratisation makes 
alterations to the public arena of politics such that, having been open to all, 
even if only illusorily, in reality it becomes closed to all but the enfranchised – 
initially, and almost without exception, “wealthy …  white … male.”107  This 
echoes Knights' observation that “representation can be the preserve of 
authoritarians as well as liberal democrats, a means to exclude as well as 
include the people.108  The demise of petitioning experienced in the twentieth 
century therefore occurred precisely because: 
“the rise of a liberal polity gutted petition of its original 
constitutional and political meaning and left those persons not 
directly included in the liberal enfranchised polity with an even 
more tenuous toehold in formal politics than petition had 
provided.”109   
Admittedly, from this perspective, full enfranchisement would provide the 
corrective required to achieve functioning participation for as many citizens as 
possible, but full enfranchisement also appears to have fallen short of its 
target, prompting a return to old participatory mechanisms, albeit in new 
technological forms.  
 
It has been argued that “institutional fixes” such as “more proportional voting 
systems, more power devolved from the centre to the local, greater use of 
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citizens’ juries and other novel methods for involving the public in decision-
making” do nothing more than “expose the inadequacies of institutional 
reengineering”110 as a solution to democracy’s apparent regression, adding to 
citizens’ “sense that when they get involved in the political process they can 
make no real difference.”111  In the current context of governmental attempts 
to boost political engagement via, inter alia, petitioning, Carman claims that: 
“it is not enough for transformative reforms … simply to ‘allow 
for’ public engagement.  If advocacy reforms are to foster … a 
participatory political culture and connect the public with 
governing institutions, then those individuals who do engage 
with the advocacy reforms  must see the process by which these 
reforms work as politically neutral and potentially influential. This 
is due to the nature of advocacy reforms, which reserve the final 
decision-taking authority to the parliament.”112    
This chimes with the assertion that, absent meaningful participation, 
democracy becomes merely an “institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means 
of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”113 whereby “popular control of 
government is limited to after-the-fact decisions on this question alone” and 
the electorate functions only “to legitimate governmental authority”114 rather 
than direct or influence governmental and legislative decision-making.  As 
Davis maintains, this “sharply reduces the extent and the intensity of 
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necessary individual participation in democratic politics” 115  but is fully 
consistent with the Westminster model, as evolved, which “emphasises 
governing capacity over other competing principles … such as participation or 
fairness”116 and excludes public access to government from conceptions of 
representative democracy.  This is related to power-holding which reveals 
“executive hostility” as the “greatest hurdle to reform”117 and the remodelling 
of petitioning as merely a cosmetic exercise.  In 1978, Judge argued that no 
Parliament would willingly limit its supremacy and this, coupled with executive 
antipathy to any diminution of its own power, meant that, whilst publicly 
presented as a means of resolving democracy’s ills and paid lip service, the 
rejuvenation of petitioning would be firmly resisted inside Parliament.118  It 
may, of course, be contended that no inevitable limitation of sovereignty will 
flow from the reform of petitioning and that, as a result, Judge's is a rather 
empty or extreme argument to make.  A firmer rebuttal may also be made 
since, with the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent that his appreciation of 
Parliament’s stewardship of its own sovereignty was imprecise.  Political 
developments resulting in, for example, membership of the European Union 
(EU), devolution, and the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), mean 
that the application of parliamentary sovereignty has, by legislative choice, 
been limited.  That is not to say, however, that Judge’s assertion in the 
specific context of petitioning is not a credible one.  The issue of prisoner 
voting, for example, provides clear, recent precedent for Parliament’s desire 
to retain its omnipotence in respect of our democratic processes and it is 
                                                                                 
115 L. Davis “The Cost of Realism: Contemporary Restatements of Democracy” (1964) 17(1) Western Political Quarterly 37, 39 
116 M Flinders Democratic Drift (Oxford University Press, 2010), p.24 
117 D. Judge “Public Petitions and the House of Commons” (1978) 4 Parl. Affs. 391, 398-400 
118 D. Judge “Public Petitions and the House of Commons” (1978) 4 Parl. Affs. 391, 404 
22 
 
strongly suggested here that our legislature would be less troubled, both 
constitutionally and politically, by the assertion of that omnipotence in respect 
of petitioning since, unlike the right to vote, the right to petition lacks explicit 
protection either from the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 1950 or from the HRA.  Given the rather speculative 
nature of any enquiry into the likely effect on Parliament’s sovereignty of the 
rejuvenation of petitioning, perhaps the real strength of Judge’s argument 
should be deemed to lie in its appreciation of executive, rather than legislative, 
resistance to change.         
 
Keane suggests that the 21st century has seen the emergence of “monitory 
democracy”119 where “mechanisms of power scrutiny … make democracy and 
democrats more accountable and more democratic … [and] … work as 
antidotes against the hubris of power that constantly threatens the functioning 
of representative systems.120  In an eclectic mix of the formal and informal, the 
public and private, the traditional and modern, those mechanisms are said by 
Navarria to include “activist courts, electoral commissions and consumer 
protection agencies, blogs, online forums, and online petitions.”121  Although 
some of these monitory forms – not least our courts, whether in activist mode 
or not - might well serve meaningful reminders that representatives have no 
absolute power or immunity from control122, in the case of petitions the ancient 
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hallmarks remain: the input is free but outputs are conditioned, conditional 
and in the gift of a hierarchical elite.   
 
Judge argued that “executive hegemony” within the House of Commons 
would “automatically confine … the most radical procedural reform, namely 
the debating of public petitions, to oblivion.”123  “For as long as the executive 
is ‘in and of the House’“, he argued, “the fissures between the needs of the 
effective governmental action and the necessity of questioning, controlling 
and addressing such action will remain apparent.”124  Given that a number of 
debates on petition topics have occurred in the early life of the reformed 
system, it would be difficult to claim the absolute veracity of Judge’s statement 
but concerns persist.  Objections have been made that the e-petitioning 
system was introduced “without any consultation, debate or vote”125, causing 
disquiet that petitioning ‘belongs’ to government, rather than Parliament.  Its 
presentation to the public obscures that fact, and conceals whether reform of 
the practice was intended to improve or outflank representative processes.  
Government’s ownership has permitted the e-petitions scheme to be pitched 
at citizens in such a way that it leads to “a perception … that there is a direct 
line between signing an e-petition and changing the law, and there is not.”126  
The suggestion here is not that, by taking ownership of petitioning, modern 
government stands in the shoes of ancient Kings - the interpolation of 
representation and procedure necessarily prevents that, not least by 
mediating and managing the directness of the relationship between legislator 
                                                                                 
123 D. Judge “Public Petitions and the House of Commons” (1978) 4 Parl. Affs. 391, 400 
124 D. Judge “Public Petitions and the House of Commons” (1978) 4 Parl. Affs. 391, 397 
125 House of Commons Procedure Committee, Seventh Report, Debates on Government E-Petitions (2010-12, HC1706), Ev3 
126 House of Commons Procedure Committee, Seventh Report, Debates on Government E-Petitions (2010-12, HC1706), Ev3, [24] 
24 
 
and citizen.  Government ownership may, however, be argued to infect 
today’s petitioning with its past incarnations’ characteristics of pragmatism 
and gesture.   
 
Albeit that the coalition soon resiled from its position that a petition attracting 
100,000 signatures would automatically trigger a debate in Parliament, and 
that petitions with ‘the most’ signatures would result in a Bill being presented, 
to one where 100,000 signatures merely signified the eligibility threshold for a 
debate, what might be viewed as fudging on the issue of petitioners’ 
entitlement to Commons’ time led to high expectations left unfulfilled and to 
further institutional distrust.  That is lent support by the Procedure 
Committee’s recent confirmation of the actual significance of passing the 
100,000 signature threshold being that it merely “triggers a letter from the 
Leader of the House to the Backbench Business Committee.”127  Members of 
Parliament were clearly alive to the dangers:  
“It is very possible that, if those expectations exceed what the 
House is prepared to offer, the consequence will be that the 
system is discredited and undermined and the reputation of the 
House, in particular in respect of its commitment to improving its 
engagement with the public, will be damaged.”128   
Despite claims for the success of the reformed system, damage has occurred.  
Dissatisfaction with the arbitrary provision, and palliate nature, of responses to 
individual petitions, and with the incoherent, random approach to the listing of 
petition subjects for debate, has led to criticism of the e-petitioning facility as 
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“another promise broken” 129 , revealing the executive’s “contempt for 
democracy.” 130   As well as causing disappointment to those outside 
Parliament, a disservice is also being done to the interests, duties and 
democratic role of representatives inside Parliament. 
Procedural Control 
From the earliest times, petitions and petitioners could be avoided by, for 
example, failing to convene Parliament, by proroguing or dissolving, or 
invoking suspending powers, by aversion through mechanisms such as the 
Court of the Star Chamber, or by appointing carefully to Council and 
committees of receivers and triers.  As our parliamentary system evolved, 
some of these means of avoidance were themselves regulated by legislation 
or convention or a culture of accountability and were not so readily used but 
other devices of abnegation emerged to take their place.  Petitioning’s 
subjection to procedural control was, more often than not, a form of inhibition 
rather than regularisation and tended to be provoked by turbulence, most 
notably in the crucible of seventeenth century political and religious conflict.131   
At the conclusion of Parliament’s struggle for supremacy, the Bill of Rights 
declared it “the Right of the Subjects to petition the King and all Commitments 
and Prosecutions for such Petitioning are Illegall.”132  Although forged out of 
the rhetoric of revolution, and despite its constitutional footing, the right to 
petition remained prone to regulatory undercutting provoked by practical 
political reality.  This was felt keenly from the late 1700s, beginning with the 
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1795 Gagging Acts’133 inhibitions on political activity which, Fraser claims, 
triggered the procedural restraint of petitioning which had, by now, gained 
incredible momentum.134     
 
In the period preceding the Reform Act 1832, it became clear that “the game 
had been overplayed”135 and that public opinion, whilst influential, could no 
longer be accommodated in the traditional way: the flourishing of petitioning 
had caused it to outgrow its channels for delivery 136  leaving currents of 
opinion “struggling for a vent.” 137   Leys puts the growth down to “rapid 
economic change … agricultural unrest, popular radicalism, and incipient 
working-class organization” resulting in an increase from 880 to 70,369 in the 
number of petitions submitted annually between 1789 and 1841. 138  
Restrictions of 1831 which confined the presentation of petitions to pre-5pm, 
after public business and on Saturdays and, in addition, mandated that 
petitions should merely be handed in, without discussion, failed to stem the 
tide.  Actions instigated in 1832, however, commenced a 10-year assault on 
petitioning, provoking a “procedural revolution”139 and ushering in the modern 
system.140   
Foundations of the Modern System 
A review of petitioning undertaken by the 1832 Select Committee on Public 
Petitions made four recommendations: that a Standing Committee for the 
receipt of petitions be created, that petitions be categorised by the Committee 
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which should periodically report on the content and number of signatories; 
that the Committee be afforded the discretion to print any petition it thought fit 
to bring to the House and that any member presenting a petition should be 
permitted to speak to it only once. 141   The second and third of these 
recommendations were adopted via sessional orders of 1833 but the resultant 
nine hours a week dedicated to the consideration of petitions was wholly 
inadequate.  The House of Commons continued to struggle with balancing the 
demands of its representative functions against the clamour of citizens’ 
petitions of every political hue.  The tension was resolved in favour 
representation over participation via robust standing orders of 1842 
preventing petitions from stimulating parliamentary debate, which effectively 
“cauterized”142 citizens’ ability to influence parliamentary business.  The deceit 
of the new regulations was obvious: they were designed “constrain”, 
“circumscribe” 143  and atrophise petitioning whilst ostensibly pretending 
conformity with the right of citizens to engage in the activity.   
 
The regulatory framework of 1842 persisted until 1974 when the Public 
Petitions Committee (PPC) was dissolved.  The reasons for its dissolution are 
revealing, and emerged from an enquiry of the Select Committee on 
Procedure undertaken in the 1972-3 parliamentary session in response to 
criticism of the restrictions placed on the petitioning system and management 
of it, made by the PPC itself.  The PPC’s members expressed dissatisfaction 
with its role being restricted to reporting to the House on signatory numbers 
and preparing abstracts of petitions to aid MPs’ digestion of their content.  The 
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reports were compiled by the PPC’s clerk, rendering Committee meetings no 
more than a rubber-stamping exercise and, given the PPC’s lack of power 
beyond that, extended to Parliament an invitation to sit on its hands in respect 
of discussing and taking forward grievances and issues raised by petitions.  
Indeed, the Select Committee enquiry received a memorandum from the 
Chair of the PPC in which he described the activities of his own Committee as 
“a waste of time.”144  Rather than address and repair these deficiencies, the 
Select Committee on Procedure reached the conclusion that the PPC should 
be abolished.  To hand it more power would offend the spirit of the 1842 
regulations which, as has been indicated, smothered rather than embraced 
petitioning.  Thus, in its dissolution, the PPC followed precisely the trajectory 
of petitioning.   
 
With the Committee no longer responsible for oversight, and with nothing to 
replace it, minimalism reigned: petitions and responses to them were 
rendered into printed form only and petitionary business relegated to the end 
of public business, pre-adjournment agenda.  Judge has it that: 
“the Parliamentary ‘management’, having turned off the 
megaphone of petitions in 1842, now simply hustled the former 
virtuoso out of the limelight of the opening of the daily sitting into 
the shadows of the adjournment”145 
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The 1974 regulations remain intact146 and have, it may be argued, “rendered 
sterile”147 the practice of petitioning, which declined markedly throughout the 
20th and into the 21st century.  As noted by Leys:  
“[w]hatever sorts of pressure can be brought to bear by means 
of petitions, they are not since 1842 the pressure of debate in 
Parliament and publicity in parliamentary reports; the machinery 
which was then evolved released the parties in Parliament from 
the threat of this sort of pressure.”148   
The number of petitions submitted continued to spike in response to political 
turbulence but in much reduced numbers than at petitioning’s height.  Post-
Thatcher, numbers hovered between 100 and 200 annually, with the fewest 
petitions – 36  – received in the 2000/1 session.149   The degradation of 
petitioning was, thus, complete and it is doubtful whether, in its latest 
incarnation, it will be permitted a significant recovery from its “moribund”150 
state since, rather than being “an easy way … to influence government 
policy”151, it is subjected to the kind of procedural gatekeeping that lends the 
lie to the idea of direct, participatory democracy as a prominent feature in the 
modern political landscape.  
Powerholding and Gatekeeping  
Government has been accused of “abdicating responsibility” 152  for the 
petitions initiative by handing its administration lock, stock and barrel to the 
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BBBC which was “not designed”153 for the task.  Moreover, accommodating 
participation by petition has impacted on Parliament’s freedom to set its own 
agenda.  The BBBC has accused Government of “clogging up” its procedures 
and “bed blocking”154 its activities by requiring that time is set aside for debate 
on petitions.  The BBBC’s Chair, with 35 days of parliamentary time available 
to her, has spoken of the dilemma of choosing to debate either issues raised 
by successful petitions or those that are politically pressing, or topical, or have 
cross-party support, but which government and the official opposition are for 
some reason reluctant to have debated.  She has also spoken of the 
importance of ensuring that petitioners’ “good faith”155 in a system promising 
direct contact with Parliament is not “sorely disappointed”156 by the reality.  
Although the handling of petitions is currently under examination, from 
Judge’s perspective any suggestion that contemplates extra-Parliamentary 
involvement will be seen as a threat to executive autonomy.157  Likewise, any 
suggestion of enlargement of the powers of the intra-Parliamentary sifting 
mechanism is likely to be met with refusal as an “unwarranted extension”158 of 
the BBBC’s power.   
 
In justifying the e-petitioning initiative, the Leader of the House, Sir George 
Young, stated that “[p]eople have strong opinions, and it does not serve 
democracy well if we ignore them or pretend that their views do not exist.”159  
Whilst it might be politically desirable, or expedient, to encourage, or be seen 
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to be encouraging, participatory initiatives, from the perspective of power-
holding it is also desirable that executive and parliamentary control is 
maintained over policy- and law-making, and Parliament’s time.  
Consequently, whilst petitioning inevitably attracts procedural control since it 
is an avenue of participation, not a freeway, it may be argued to be a-typically 
susceptible to such control, meaning that the need to ration access to 
Parliament so that it remains a creature of representative, rather than random, 
direct democracy, results in the right to petition appearing to be significantly 
undercut.  According to how it manifests, and depending upon the strictures 
imposed, the exertion of procedural control over petitioning may be viewed as 
sensible balancing or as (political) manipulation and inhibition of 
communication with, or access to, elected representatives and policy-making.  
The impact is exacerbated when popular petitioning is, indeed, popular, since 
regulatory command and control tends to wax and wane with the 
administrative and political burdens imposed by the activity.  Generally 
speaking, the greater its weight, the more strictured petitioning becomes.  In 
other words, petitioning is the classic victim of its own success. 
 
Gatekeeping occurs through agenda-setting and through strategies of 
avoidance via the imposition of specific rules and regulations governing 
petitionary practice.  On the first count, it is apparent that a degree of 
substantial agenda-setting – generally by way of inhibitions on the kinds of 
issues that are appropriately subject to petitioning - may occur.  The National 
Framework for Citizen Engagement, for example, specifically identified four 
areas that would benefit from greater public participation: those resulting in 
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significant constitutional change (such as membership of, or withdrawal from, 
the EU); where individuals need to act (smoking, obesity); where government 
is open-minded on policy options and where it would be beneficial to explore 
options.160  This top-down conceptualisation of the proper role and focus of 
politically engaged citizens exercising their participatory rights may be argued 
to have infected e-petitioning practice, not least given Sir George Young’s 
comment, at launch, that government wanted “the best”161  petitions to be 
given parliamentary airtime.  Selection criteria for ‘the best’ petitions remained 
elusive but the 100,000 signature threshold proved a red herring.  Whilst 
substantial support might not be required neither would it necessarily be 
sufficient.  In its January 2012 report, the Procedure Committee indicated 
clearly that, irrespective of the presence of the 100,000 signature threshold, 
any e-petition might be eligible for debate162, yet no debate has occurred on 
any sub-100,000 signature e-petition, or seems likely to given the 
government’s suggestion that the threshold be doubled in order to reduce the 
pressure on Parliament’s ability to handle petitions.163  Too hasty a decision to 
elevate the threshold is likely to exacerbate disillusionment but it is, of course, 
tricky to predict future demands on current procedural arrangements.  The 
dilemma was posed succinctly by the Procedure Committee: “Demand may 
decrease once the novelty … has worn off; on the other hand, petitioners, the 
media and campaign groups may become more expert at gathering the 
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requisite number of signatures.” 164   Not that meeting the criterion for 
numerical support carries any guarantee: a 160,000 signatory petition on NHS 
reforms was denied debating time, and the 149,104 signatories to a petition to 
have Babar Ahmed tried in the UK were satisfied neither by a debate nor 
formal response.  The discrepancies in procedural outcomes procured by 
petitioning in individual cases are in marked contrast to the consistency of 
outcomes in dealing with the mass of petitions registered where, like salmon 
swimming upstream, only the fittest survive to spawn a response or debate.   
 
In the twelve months since the launch of the e-petitions facility 29,038 
petitions have been lodged online.  Nearly half have been rejected.  Reasons 
for rejection are fivefold: that the petition contained confidential, libellous, false 
or defamatory statements; that it covered matters beyond the responsibility of 
HM Government; that it concerned honours or appointments; that it was an 
offensive, joke or nonsense petition or that duplicated the subject matter of an 
existing petition.165  This last reason provided the basis for rejection in 62% of 
cases in the first quarter of the system’s operation.166  There is no means by 
which signatures to a duplicate petition are automatically added to a ‘mother’ 
petition on that subject: the petition, and the participatory endeavour it 
represents, is lost.  The second highest number of rejections occurred in the 
‘offensive, joke or nonsense’ category, accounting for 12% of all rejections.  
Whilst a much smaller number, this might be regarded as a significant 
interference with the fundamental right of freedom of expression, which 
affords protection to offensive, joke or nonsense ‘speech’.  Free expression  
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“includes not only the inoffensive but the irritating, the 
contentious, the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and the 
provocative provided it does not tend to provoke violence.  
Freedom only to speak inoffensively is not worth having.”    
This is especially important in the democratic sphere where “the free 
communication of information, opinions and argument about the laws which a 
state should enact and the policies its government at all levels should pursue 
is an essential condition of truly democratic government.” 167 
 
Thus far, in considering the implications of procedural regulation of e-
petitions, the focus has been on human resources, rather than human rights.  
It is, of course, understood that, in order to be pitched as an enhancement to 
democracy, the system must be seen to function, or at least not to 
malfunction.  That said, it is hardly satisfactory that the maintenance of the 
practical functionality of petitioning threatens to undermine one of the bedrock 
principles of the democracy it is intended to serve, yet that is not the only way 
in which democracy may be undermined by the reality of petitioning.  There is 
a conundrum which emerges from the juxtaposition of modern liberal 
democratic rights with the ancient participatory practice of petitioning.  That 
conundrum is not unique to petitioning since it manifests in respect of many 
“devices of democracy”168 where modern philosophies of formal equality of 
access fail to translate into substantive equality of inputs or outcomes.  The 
upshot is that those devices are rendered open to capture by some, to the 
exclusion of others. 
                                                                                 
167 R. (on the application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (2008) UKHL 15, [27-8] 
168 F. Schauer ““JudiciaL. R.eview of the Devices of Democracy” (1994) 94(4) Col. L.R. 1326 
35 
 
Capture by ‘Troublemakers’ and Elites 
It is difficult to read the participatory and political implications of early 
collective petitionary activity.  Opinion is certainly divided.  Harding, for 
example, notes that “the one steady development in thirteenth century 
agrarian society was the incorporation of the peasantry into a common culture 
of rights and obligations.”169  This does not mean that there existed a fully 
functioning, enfranchised political community freely exercising those rights 
and liberties which would, today, attend democracy but, by the later Middle 
Ages, there existed limited power “to act in the affairs of the community, and 
to exert influence on one’s fellows, free from the interference of the sovereign 
government.”170  Harriss characterises the late medieval political system as an 
“historical amalgam”171 where participatory activity, reflecting the turbulence of 
the era, meant that “baronial opponents placed constraints on royal power … 
the middling classes claimed authority through parliament to reform 
government for the common good … [and] the plebs revolted in the name of 
natural justice.” 172   In Mark’s view, the early practice of petitioning 
demonstrated a “participatory consciousness that extended well beyond even 
that which underlies some quite modern concepts of enfranchisement”.173  
What is clear is that a “significant minority”174 of petitions was submitted in the 
name of groups, communities and classes and would often assert a broad 
public interest rather than one more narrowly and specifically tailored to an 
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individual.175  The evolution of group, public interest-type petitioning may be 
argued to have engendered a qualitative shift in the nature of petitioning.   
 
The first aspect of petitioning as it evolved is that, whilst it sometimes entailed 
group political activity, it had not yet become a tool of mass political 
participation.  It remained, more often than not, an instrument employed to 
protect the interests of the gentry, the clergy and political and urban elites.176  
Ormrod notes that although petitioning provided a “significant outlet” for what 
might loosely be termed popular politics, for centuries “the voice of the 
establishment expected to carry greater weight than that of the poorer sort.”177  
Generally speaking, therefore, petitioning was conducted largely by, and for 
the benefit of, elites within society and, well into the 1800s would continue to 
reflect “the interests of corporations, religious denominations, economic 
bodies, and all the fixed and settled adjustments of a society whose spirit was 
traditional and static.”178  Traditional and static society might have appeared 
but that did not signify an absence of tension arising out of, for example, 
dissatisfaction with patronage politics, industrialisation, the emergence of new 
ideas and policy choices and expanding government.179  The combination of 
the ‘establishment’ tenor and usage of petitioning, coupled with the presence 
of motivated, factional interests inside the establishment itself, resulted in 
petitioning being employed to exert pressure both from without and within.  As 
has been indicated, petitions were often used as weapons in the battle for 
                                                                                 
175 D. Rayner “The Forms and Machinery of the Commune Petition in the Fourteenth Century I” (1941) 56(Apr) No.222 Engl. Hist. Rev. 198 
176 J. Spanbauer “The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth” (1993-94) 21 
Hastings Const.  L.Q. 15, 24-25 
177 “Medieval Petitions in Context” in M. Ormrod, G. Dodd and A. Musson (eds) Medieval Petitions: Grace and Grievance (York Medieval Press, 
2009), p.2 
178 P. Fraser “Public Petitioning and Parliament Before 1832” (1961) 46(158) History 195, 200 
179 See A. Lizzeri and N. Persico “Why Did the Elites Extend Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an  Application to 
Britain”s Age of Reform” (2004) 119(2) Quart. J. Econ. 707 
37 
 
supremacy and were thus “central to Parliament’s accumulation of power.”180  
The gaining of power did not exhaust the utility of petitions for the ruling elite, 
however, since they continued to prove their value in setting the political 
agenda, sometimes covertly.  Petitions regularly emerged out of the 
manipulation and organisation of petitioning “from above”181, both by direct 
command and control of groups of petitioners, and by fomenting petitioning 
through indirect means, namely print and propaganda.  Thus, influence was 
wielded via petitions which, although they appeared to be generated by ‘the 
people’, were often anything but.  In the modern context, too, it has been 
noted that “those who have control of the levers of powers have speedily used 
e-petitions to advance their causes.”182  It is, perhaps, noteworthy that, of the 
ten petitions garnering 100,000 signatures or more in the year since the 
coalition’s e-petition system went live, only four could be deemed free of 
interest group or professional links.183  
 
Arguing that the kind of collective activity promoted by petitioning was never 
necessarily benign, Ormrod states that, even in its earliest incarnation, it was 
often underpinned by “cynically opportunistic … mobilisations of the theme of 
common profit for the pursuit of sectional, factional or class interests” 184 
buttressed by the avowal of commonality, a “long and strong tradition” 
undertaken by communities “either formally constituted … or pragmatically 
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imagined.”185 Indeed, political pragmatism loomed large in petitioning activity.  
Leys notes, for example, that where, initially, petitions had been employed to 
alert Parliament to a genuine grievance in the hope of securing redress, later 
“a substantial crop of petitions [were] presented by political activists under no 
sort of illusion either that the grievance was unknown or that Parliament might 
reasonably been expected to respond by redressing it.”186   The petition had 
arguably “changed in the minds and the hands of people from a form of 
submission to an instrument of mischief.” 187  It might therefore be employed 
to “serve the agenda of those who want to influence popular consent in 
support of questionable politics” 188  or as a “popular mechanism” 189  for 
publicity generation and awareness-raising.       
 
Those problems of elite capture and troublemaking undoubtedly persist, with 
the view being expressed that “[n]ational direct democracy can be vulnerable 
to being manipulated by the wealthy and powerful who can dominate single 
issue campaigns more easily than the complex layers of political activity that 
characterise the operation of parliamentary democracy.”190  It has also been 
observed that democracy is “increasingly an interest of the better-off and the 
better educated”191, an observation borne out in a study of the e-petitioning 
system in Scotland.  The Scottish Parliament launched its e-petitions system 
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in 1999 as a “transformative reform … designed to foster … advocacy 
democracy” 192  yet found that petitioners were, in the main, older, male, 
middle-class and educated.193  The German Bundestag’s petitioning system 
reveals a similar profile194 and, whilst Westminster e-petitioners remain to be 
studied in detail, there is no reason to suppose that any particular 
demographic variance will be apparent.  What might well be revealed, 
however, is the presence of a professional elite.  In the Scottish system over a 
quarter of petitions had been submitted by professionals.195  For Smith the 
presence of professional petition creators and circulators engaged in raising 
enough signatures to meet procedural thresholds indicates that ability to pay 
is a “highly significant” 196  enabler of political participation even where 
innovations are targeted at regular citizens.  The concerns are magnified 
when the media - another source of professionalisation – becomes involved.  
The BBBC was, for example, cautioned that it should be “wary of manipulation 
by the media” and should not be surprised that e-petitioning was “increasingly 
being reclaimed from Parliament by the real powers in politics—the media and 
the Government.”197  It was, moreover, noted that “[m]any” e-petitions were 
started by national newspapers and were “breaching the 100,000 signature 
threshold in under a week.”198  This is not corroborated by an examination of 
the e-petitions themselves.  Newspapers, or the media more generally, do not 
tend to start petitions but they are able to stimulate signatories.  The concerns 
expressed are threefold: that representative government will be 
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disempowered, that accountability will be reduced and the system poisoned 
by “orchestrated campaigns promoted by the media or professional 
lobbyists.” 199   In other words, petitioning, as revived and reformed, may 
exacerbate the very issues it was intended to eliminate, or at least avoid.     
Conclusion 
Skidmore and Bound state that “the decline in support for representative 
institutions has been more erosion than earthquake:  … gradual, but 
persistent, and in the long term, dramatic.”200  It remains to be seen whether 
initiatives of democratic renewal, such as e-petitioning, can halt that decline.  
It has been suggested here that petitioning suffers a number of defects 
attributable to its constitutional and political heritage.  First, it maintains a 
model of authority based upon a traditional, top-down hierarchy which is 
antagonistic to the facilitation of bottom-up decision-making.  That petitioning 
lends itself to this kind of model is highly indicative of its early roots as a 
means of supplication and entreaty.  That, in its freshest incarnation, it 
appears to retain those qualities, raises questions about its stated utility as a 
device of modern, dialogic democracy.  Second, it permits the democratic 
process to be populated and driven by the interests of the political haut 
monde and ‘troublemakers’.  Again, the vestiges of the past may be seen but 
the capture of democratic processes is perhaps as much a manifestation of 
present conditions as past ones, albeit for different reasons.  Third, its efficacy 
is susceptible to procedural undercutting.  Viewed from any perspective, 
ancient or modern, a soon-discovered need for procedural ‘management’ has 
become the leitmotif of petitioning practice.  The government’s e-petitioning 
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facility may be argued to have been successful in “building a bridge between 
people and Parliament and in ensuring that the House’s diet reflects the 
interests of those outside.”201  It may also be contended that, as conceived 
and subsequently experienced, in the first months of its operation the e-
petitioning facility has exhibited some of the attributes of the smoke-and-
mirrors phony participation to which Judge referred.  Whatever the truth, e-
petitioning as now practised has drawn attention both to the “lumbering nature 
of parliamentary procedure” 202  and to the importance of procedure as a 
facilitating or checking mechanism on political participation.  That has, 
however, been clear for centuries. The launch of the new system has 
revealed its procedural issues most clearly.  As such, the focus has been on 
practical, quick-fix procedural tweaking at the expense of principled 
philosophical debate.  In its January 2012 report, the Procedure Committee 
eschewed the “wider philosophical question”203 of the public’s engagement 
with Parliament as beyond the scope of its enquiry.  Instead a more 
“constructive dialogue” 204  between petitioners and Parliament was sought 
through procedural change.  Recommendations included innovations in the 
location, scheduling and casting of debates205, modifying the copy on the 
DirectGov website 206 , linking the DirectGov and BBBC websites more 
prominently207, advising petitioners on selecting an MP to sponsor and steer 
the petition through the BBBC208 and alerting MPs to any petition cresting the 
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100,000 signature mark.209  Whilst this procedural finessing is very welcome, 
it seems unlikely that it will overcome the more profound issues raised by 
declining democracy and attempts at its repair.       
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